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Abstract: 
Three models of leadership in voluntary associations have been proposed in the literature: 
democratic leadership, oligarchy, and leadership by default. Through an intensive case study of 
leadership structure, differences in the attitudes of members and leaders at three hierarchical 
levels, and differences between the attitudes and behaviors of aspirants and nonaspirants to 
leadership in a women's service association, this article examines the degree of fit between these 
models and a specific organization. Data is drawn from questionnaires, annual reports, and 
interviews. The results fail to conform to any of the existing models, suggesting instead a fourth 
model, leadership for self-development—in which leaders are motivated primarily by a desire to 
develop administrative and interpersonal skills.  
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Article: 
INTRODUCTION 
The ubiquity of voluntary associations has long been viewed as an important structural feature of 
U.S. society (Smith, 1973; Tocqueville, 1841; Van Til, 1988), and such associations are 
important in other societies as well (Wuthrow, 1991; Zimmer, 1996). Voluntary associations 
play important roles in leisure (Scheuch, 1993), defining and proposing solutions for social 
problems (Knoke and Wood, 1981; Van Til, 1988), linking interest-group goals to policy (Sahne, 
1993; Smith, 1986), and providing social services (Smith, 1993). They outnumber other types of 
nonprofit organizations, and research findings from other nonprofits may not generalize well to 
them, as much of their work is accomplished by unpaid volunteers (Smith and Shen, 1996). 
Various typologies of voluntary associations have been proposed (Knoke and Wright-Izak, 1982, 
Smith, 1993). None is completely satisfactory, but most converge around three broad types: (1) 
organizations that primarily benefit members – often by meeting social, spiritual, or recreational 
needs; (2) organizations that attempt to influence society or politics; and (3) organizations that 
provide services to the community. 
Leadership is a crucial issue for voluntary associations, and the issues involved are somewhat 
different from those in the corporate sector or government (Blau and Scott, 1962; Drucker, 1990; 
Pearce, 1993). Leadership selection and succession are frequently less formal, and leaders often 
receive little or no monetary compensation. Candidates for leadership positions can be hard to 
find (Pearce, 1980, 1982; Rich, 1980), and those who aspire to leadership may be mainly 
interested in using the organization as a tool to advance a personal agenda (Miller, 1987) or as a 
path to material rewards, prestige, and power (Barber, 1965; Michels, 1962). Many voluntary 
associations are consequently dominated by an active minority of leaders (Michels, 1962; Rose, 
1967). Leaders play an important role in building member interest and commitment (Etzioni, 
1975; Pearce, 1993); however, member apathy or leaders’ efforts to maintain their positions can 
create self-perpetuating leadership cliques (Michels, 1962; Styrjan, 1994), resulting in 
diminished influence and leadership opportunities for others and blocked communication 
between members and leaders. The result can be decreased member commitment and increased 
attrition, threatening organizational viability (Bass and Stogdill, 1990; Onyx, 1994) and 
effectiveness (Wiesenthal, 1993). 
Despite the topic’s importance, relatively little is known about voluntary association leadership, 
especially since studies of leadership in nonprofit organizations, where most of the work is 
accomplished by paid staff (e.g., Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997), may not generalize well to 
voluntary associations. Most existing research consists of relatively atheoretical studies of single 
associations, one type of organization, or comparative questionnaire studies of organizations in a 
single community (e.g., Adams, l980; Black and Platt, 1978; Egri and Hermann, 2000; Rich, 
1980; Widmer, 1985). Most examine only a few leader characteristics, and some fail to report 
members’ responses for comparison. We could find only one (Black and Platt, 1978) that 
examines leadership above the local chapter level and none that looks at the characteristics and 
attitudes of those who aspire to leadership positions. In short, the existing literature is 
characterized by a descriptive and fragmentary approach. 
This study helps to fill these gaps in the literature. We use questionnaire, interview, and 
documentary data collected in l975 and l992 from the local, regional, and headquarters levels of 
the “International Association of Women” (a pseudonym), a higher-status women’s community 
service organization operating in the United States and several other countries, to evaluate how 
well three theoretical models of voluntary association leadership fit this organization. More 
specifically, we (1) examine key structural features of the association and its leadership, (2) 
compare the characteristics and attitudes of rank and file members with those of present and past 
chapter leaders and regional and headquarters leaders, (3) compare the characteristics and 
attitudes of members who do and do not aspire to leadership roles, and (4) investigate possible 
consequences of our results for organizational efficiency and member satisfaction. Based on 
these analyses, we conclude that results from the “International Association of Women” (IAW) 
do not fit well any of the existing models. Our findings suggest instead an up to now undescribed 
fourth model, leadership for self-development, in which leaders are motivated primarily by a 
desire to use leadership position for the development of administrative and interpersonal skills. 
We also examine conditions that may have contributed to the evolution of this pattern within 
IAW and speculate about whether it might appear in other organizations as well. 
THEORIES OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION LEADERSHIP 
Three theoretical models of voluntary association leadership have been proposed: democratic 
leadership, oligarchy, and leadership by default. Each emphasizes the connections between 
leadership and problems facing voluntary associations. 
The Democratic Leadership Model 
In the democratic model, leaders are motivated primarily by desire to serve and commitment to 
the organization and its goals. They are selected by a democratic process based on their 
qualifications and platforms. Leadership turnover occurs regularly, as leaders voluntarily yield 
their positions to elected successors. Many members are willing to serve as leaders, even when 
doing so requires sacrifice. Leaders function as administrative specialists, but because most 
members are interested and committed, members inform themselves about the association and 
participate actively in decision making, providing them the chance to learn leadership skills. 
Members and leaders are highly satisfied, and membership turnover is low. 
While democracy is widely espoused, research (Lipset et al., 1956; Michels, 1962; Pearce, 1980, 
1982, 1993; Selle and Stromnes, 1998) suggests that it is fairly rarely achieved and difficult to 
maintain—and then often at considerable cost to efficiency (Cox, 1994; Rothschild and Whitt, 
1986). It is most likely to appear in organizations in which members are strongly committed to 
consensual decision making (Onyx, 1994). Such organizations discourage careerism in 
leadership and cultivate homogeneity and organizational commitment among members. Low 
reliance on specialized skills, small size, independence from outside pressures, and a supportive 
cultural milieu can also foster democracy (Kanter, 1972; Rothschild and Whitt, 1986; Styrjan, 
1989). 
The Oligarchic Leadership Model 
Based on his study of turn-of-the-century European unions and political parties, Michels (1962) 
formulated his famous iron law of oligarchy. It holds that, despite democratic ideologies and 
forms, such organizations almost always evolve toward rule by an entrenched elite. Subsequent 
research (Brulle, 2000; Hall, 1999; Scheuch, 1993) suggests that his model may be broadly 
applicable to voluntary associations. 
Michels notes that voluntary association leaders receive prestige, various perquisites, and in 
some cases remuneration, so leadership can be attractive. But leadership is time consuming and 
can require expertise based on long experience and participation in networks of outside contacts. 
Experienced leaders thus become almost irreplaceable. Moreover, key decisions must sometimes 
be made quickly, making democracy cumbersome. Many rank and file members lack the interest, 
knowledge, skills, and time to participate actively in organizational decision making. Hence, they 
are usually willing to abdicate participation in democratic governance in favor of oligarchical 
leaders. 
Members with charismatic qualities and extensive involvement in social networks are especially 
likely to rise to leadership. Once in office, they are generally reluctant to give up its rewards. 
They work to master the technical aspects of leadership, cultivate connections inside and outside 
the organization that enhance their credibility and effectiveness, and actively display their 
expertise and success. They emphasize the need for quick, informed decisions based on their 
well-informed judgment. They often pursue policies congruent with members’ goals and seek to 
provide the rewards members desire, but, if necessary, they will dissemble and compromise their 
principles to remain in office. 
Incumbent leaders use every mechanism available to control the selection of new leaders, 
manipulating ostensibly democratic procedures to perpetuate their rule. They seek to place their 
friends in leadership roles and insist that aspiring leaders serve long apprenticeships, providing 
time to shape aspirants’ attitudes and assess their devotion to the status quo. Rising leaders thus 
come to emphasize the same material and prestige rewards that motivate existing leaders. 
Challenges to entrenched leadership are rare. Leaders view such challenges as serious threats and 
usually resist successfully, so leadership turnover is slow. Even when a challenge to leadership 
succeeds, the conditions that initially led to oligarchy soon reproduce it. 
The Leadership by Default Model 
Based on her study of leadership in six voluntary associations in the United States, Pearce (1980, 
1982; see also Pearce, 1993) described an alternative model, leadership by default, and examples 
of this pattern also sometimes surface in case studies of other voluntary associations (e.g., 
Weinbach, 1998). Contrary to Michels, Pearce maintains that the most problematic aspect of 
voluntary association leadership is motivating anyone to lead. Most leaders are unremunerated or 
poorly remunerated and receive few perquisites. They typically have little influence over 
members, who can reduce their effort or resign if they are dissatisfied with leaders’ goals or 
policies. Leadership offers little gain in autonomy, as members can already choose their own 
activities and involvement level. Leaders’ efforts to achieve their goals are thus frequently 
frustrated, and they must often undertake much work themselves. 
 
Most members have obligations that conflict with the demands of leadership, and their needs are 
often better met by participation as ordinary members than by administrative activity. Most 
members thus eschew leadership. Leadership devolves to members who have few conflicting 
obligations, see leadership as a social activity, or have relatively strong commitment to the 
organization’s goals. Leaders see increased member participation in decisions not as a threat, but 
as a welcome opportunity to share the burdens of leadership. Leaders are usually more than 
willing to depart after serving their terms—if only a successor can be found. 
Summary 
Democratic leadership is a cultural ideal, enshrined in the bylaws of many voluntary associations 
(Knoke, 1986;Van Til, 1988)—and occasionally realized in practice (Kanter, 1972; Rothschild 
and Whitt, 1986; Styrjan, 1989). The oligarchic and leadership by default models were 
developed from research to describe typical patterns of leadership toward which voluntary 
associations often evolve (Michels, 1962; Pearce, 1980, 1982). The organizational structure and 
the attitudes and behaviors of leaders, aspirants to leadership, and rank and file members in each 
model typically occur together and are mutually reinforcing. Oligarchy and leadership by default, 
in particular, thus tend to perpetuate themselves. Under favorable conditions, this may also be 
true of democracy, but it is less stable and often devolves into one of the other two. 
Distinctive characteristics of the democratic model include an abundance of aspirants to 
leadership, democratic leadership selection, steady and substantial leadership turnover, and 
decentralization of knowledge and power. Both leaders and members are committed to the 
association and its goals, devote considerable time and energy to the association, prefer 
decentralization of power, and are highly satisfied. Aspirants and nonaspirants to leadership are 
generally similar in terms of desired organizational rewards, competing role demands, 
knowledge of the organization, power in the organization, preference for decentralized power, 
amount and nature of involvement in the association, and level and sources of satisfaction. 
The oligarchic model is characterized by a relatively small pool of aspirants to leadership, tight 
control of leadership selection by existing leaders, and slow leadership turnover. In comparison 
to members, leaders are much more motivated by material and prestige rewards; hold a near 
monopoly on knowledge of the organization and power; prefer more centralized power; devote 
much more energy and time to the organization, especially to administrative activity; dominate 
outside contacts; and are more satisfied, particularly with material and prestige rewards. 
Aspirants to leadership are much more motivated by self-aggrandizement than nonaspirants, are 
more likely to prefer centralized power, devote more time to the organization, and have more 
links to other associations. Because their high aspirations for material and prestige rewards have 
not yet been realized, they are less satisfied than other members with these rewards. They are 
likely to be somewhat better informed about the organization and have somewhat more power 
than ordinary members. 
The leadership by default model is noteworthy for the almost total absence of leadership 
aspirants and the conscription of leaders, whose primary qualification is willingness to serve, 
often because of relatively limited role conflict. Because of widespread member disinterest in 
administration, leaders are more knowledgeable; devote more time to the organization, especially 
to administration; and have somewhat more power. They do not differ much from members in 
the rewards they desire from participation, but they prefer less centralized power. Heavy 
workloads make them less satisfied with their participation than other members. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA SOURCES 
Research about voluntary association leadership is at a very early stage. Few studies exist, and 
many of these are atheoretical surveys of leaders using noncomparable instruments (e.g., Adams 
l980; Black and Platt, 1978;Widmer, 1985). Leadership in many types of associations has not 
been studied at all, so no comprehensive quantitative baseline data exist. By contrast, the 
available theoretically informed research consists of case studies used to develop or refine the 
three existing models (e.g., Lipset et al., 1966; Pearce, 1980, 1982; Rothschild and Whitt, 1986; 
Styrjan, 1989). Such case studies do not provide quantitative baseline data about the entire 
population of voluntary associations, but they do offer empirically derived, testable predictions 
about association leadership. That is, they assert that specific conditions (e.g., in the oligarchic 
pattern, leaders motivated by personal aggrandizement, slow leader turnover, centralized power, 
etc.) occur together and support one another. We believe that, at the present stage of knowledge 
and in view of cost constraints, the most promising research strategy is a series of thorough case 
studies designed to determine whether the conditions described by the models actually occur 
together, to see whether the models display stability, and to explore the conditions favoring the 
development and maintenance of each. 
In line with this strategy, this research provides a detailed case study of leadership in one 
voluntary association studied at two points in time. It provides point-by-point comparisons of the 
organization with key features of each existing model. Because the models are conceptualized as 
systems of mutually reinforcing variables, the data would be consistent with a model only if they 
showed that the association conformed to it in almost all of the key particulars—though not 
necessarily in every detail. Especially in the case of the oligarchy and leadership by default 
models, the data should also reveal stability of the pattern over time. 
The Organization Studied 
The “International Association of Women” is an international, young women’s organization with 
about 200,000 members in 300 chapters, the great majority in the United States and Canada. Its 
official goals are to provide service to the communities where it operates, develop members’ 
skills for volunteer work and community leadership, and promote volunteerism. Local chapters 
pursue these goals by (1) raising funds for dispersal to community programs or agencies, (2) 
operating community service projects of their own, (3) providing volunteers for community 
projects, and (4) educating members about the community and training them for volunteerism 
and voluntary leadership. In recent years, the central organization and some local chapters have 
also initiated occasional efforts to influence public policy in areas of concern to members. 
IAW is well known for its fund-raising prowess, and most of the funds at local chapters’ disposal 
come from fund-raising efforts, such as operating resale shops, preparation and sale of 
cookbooks, or staging community events, and not from the United Way, government, or 
foundation grants. Although chapters often make direct financial contributions to various 
community agencies or charities, most of each chapter’s work is centered around its own 
projects, which it supports with volunteers and funds. These are organized efforts toward 
ameliorating a community problem, often in cooperation with other community organizations, 
such as schools or nongovernmental social service agencies. The most frequent themes of 
projects are education, child health and mental health, child welfare, and cultural enrichment. 
IAW is thus best classified as a community service organization (Markham et al., 1999). It does 
not identify itself as primarily a leadership-training organization, but training for community 
service and leadership is among its goals, and some members may be attracted for this reason. 
Local chapters are governed by elected officers and a board of directors, which includes major 
officers. Committees of members plan, organize, and oversee work in such areas as fundraising, 
community projects, member recruitment and training, and communications. Each IAW member 
has one or more formal work assignments as a project volunteer, committee member, or officer. 
Only a few chapters have paid administrators, but most have some clerical assistance. 
IAW has a history as an elite organization, with a membership centered in the upper class. 
Young women were “invited” to join only after being recommended by several current members. 
In recent years, it has steadily broadened its membership base. By 1992, membership was 
officially open to any woman with a commitment to volunteerism (Johnson, 1993). At present, a 
large majority of the members would be classified as upper middle class, but there is a 
significant number of upper class members, and a few from the lower middle class. Members are 
typically well-educated and from families with well-above- to far-above-average incomes. About 
two-thirds of members are employed outside the home, including about half who work full-time 
(Markham and Bonjean, 1996). Both employed members, and where applicable their husbands, 
typically hold positions in the business-oriented segment of the upper middle class, including 
management and managerial support occupations, law, business service occupations, insurance, 
real estate, finance, securities sales, and the medical professions. There are relatively few 
representatives of the intellectual “new middle class” and relatively few members of minority 
groups (Markham and Bonjean, 1995). Four-fifths of members are married, three quarters are in 
their 30s, and two-thirds have children (Markham and Bonjean, 1996). 
Most new members enter IAW in their 20s or early 30s. After a short probationary period, 
emphasizing training about IAW and community, they become regular members. IAW assumes 
that their members will be functioning as trained, experienced volunteers by their early-to-mid 
40s, so its chapters require “retirement,” usually at age 40–45. Retired members adopt a reduced 
role, paying dues with little formal participation. 
In 1975, IAW had a well-developed regional level of organization. By 1992, regional staffs had 
been absorbed by the headquarters staff and regional offices closed, but regional boards of 
directors—renamed regional consultants and assigned purely consultative roles near the end of 
the 1992 study—continued to be seen as a level of leadership between the Headquarters Board of 
Directors and local chapters. The Headquarters Board includes all IAW officers and has 
responsibility for setting policy for the association and overseeing a substantial headquarters 
staff. The staff has gained somewhat greater influence in recent years, but the board retains the 
final say. There has also been concern about reduced chapter autonomy in recent years, but local 
chapters enjoy substantial autonomy in choosing fund raising strategies and community projects 
(Johnson, 1993), and members believe that local chapter boards have more influence than the 
national organization over what happens in their chapters. 
Data Collection 
Our data about ordinary chapter members and chapter board members come from questionnaires 
administered in a random sample of U.S. and Canadian chapters stratified by chapter size. All 12 
chapters initially selected for the sample in 1975 agreed to participate, both in 1975 and 1992. 
Because most of the IAW’s growth was occurring in the southern United States, an additional 
randomly selected chapter from this region was added in 1992. In 1992, chapters varied from 
112 to 486 members. They were located in metropolitan areas ranging from just under 100,000 
to several million population. 
The designs of the 1975 and 1992 studies were virtually identical. We administered 
questionnaires to all those present at general membership meetings of each chapter. Rank and 
file members and members of chapter boards of directors, whom we categorize as leaders, 
completed the same questionnaire. Absentees received questionnaires by mail. In 1992, response 
rates ranged from 53 to 97% (only one chapter was below 60%), with an overall rate of 74% (N 
D 1800). Fifteen percent of local chapter members were board members; 11% were former board 
members. 
Because their perspectives might have been affected by their service, we treat the latter group 
separately in the analyses. Since they had only a few months as members, probationary members 
are not included in the analysis. We also administered modified versions of the questionnaire at 
meetings of the regional and headquarters boards of directors. In 1992, 100% of regional board 
members (N D 47) and 84% of Headquarters Board members (N D 36) were included. Most of 
our measures are available for all levels of leadership; however, the need to gather additional 
information from regional and headquarters leaders, coupled with constraints on questionnaire 
length, made it impossible to include a few of the measures on these questionnaires (the 
omissions are indicated by dashes in the relevant columns of Table I). 
Several measures come from the annual reports published by each chapter. Reports vary in 
content and level of detail, but they are far more complete than those of most voluntary 
associations. We also use data from lengthy semistructured interviews with all chapter presidents 
and 12 of 13 presidents-elect in 1992.6 
Measures Derived from Questionnaire Data 
This section briefly describes measures constructed from questionnaire responses in the 1992 
study. We used questionnaire data to assess two characteristics of IAW’s overall leadership 
structure. Number of aspirants was determined by asking members if they would like to serve on 
the chapter board. Rate of leadership turnover was measured as board members’ mean response 
to an item about time on the board. 
Questionnaire data also provided information about differences in the behavior and views of 
leaders and other members and between aspirants and nonaspirants to leadership (reported in 
Tables I and II). Measures used in these tables are described in the following paragraphs. 
Table I. Differences in Mean Responses of Members and Leaders at Local, Regional 
Variable  η2 Local 
members 
(N=1324) 
Local 
board 
members 
(N=270) 
Past local 
board 
members 
(N=206) 
Regional 
board 
members 
(N=47) 
National 
board 
members 
(n=36) 
N 
Desired rewards of participation 
Leadership and 
self-development  
0.08a  8.23  10.72b  10.14b  12.67b  12.17b  1862 
Community 
involvement  
0.01c  14.98  15.52  15.13  16.60d  16.71d  1868 
Status attainment 
and maintenance  
0.01a  2.70  2.93  2.79  1.85d  1.78b  1869 
Organizational 
efficiency and 
flexibility  
0.00  10.39  10.73  10.70  9.96  10.47  1869 
Sociability and 
affiliation  
0.01c  5.49  5.87b  5.48  5.11  5.33  1875 
Interest in 
internal activities  
0.10a  2.70  4.15b  3.31b  —  —  1758 
Interest in 
external activities  
0.01a  7.19  7.76b  7.38  —  —  1739 
Status concern  0.02a  4.44  3.96b  4.24  2.82b  3.19b  1832 
Competing role demands 
Employed  0.01c  0.67  0.59b  0.70  0.76  0.62  1849 
Number of 
children  
0.04a  1.35  1.68b  1.87b  2.19b  1.91b  1785 
Child under age 6  0.02a  0.47  0.46  0.37b  0.20b  0.06b  1777 
Perceived role 
conflict  
0.00  5.70  5.86  5.99  5.27  5.34  1841 
Knowledge of organization 
Knowledge of 
local chapters  
0.37a  6.26  10.23b  9.60b  7.85b  8.58b  1855 
Knowledge of 
regional level  
0.24a  0.91  1.76b  1.56b  2.79b  3.00b  1871 
Knowledge of 
headquarters 
level  
0.12a  1.37  2.40b  2.09b  4.21b  —  1823 
Knowledge of 
headquarters 
activities  
0.15a  5.95  7.92b  7.64b  10.91b  12.80b  1840 
Exercise of power 
Participation in 
decisions  
0.19a  6.89  12.46b  10.00b  —  —  1750 
Desired distribution of power 
Difference 
between desired 
member and 
chapter board 
control 
0.01a  0.36  0.40  0.28  -0.24b  0.63  1865 
Difference 
between desired 
member and 
regional 
headquarters 
control 
0.08a  -0.64  -1.36b  -1.25b  -1.57b  -0.78  1839 
Nature of organizational involvement 
Hours per week 
devoted to IAW  
0.21a  3.47  9.62b  4.53b  8.07b  11.72b  1796 
Time spent on 
internal activities  
0.31a  1.38  4.17b  2.80b  —  —  1772 
Time spent on 
external activities  
0.05a  3.57  4.99b  4.86b  —  —  1753 
Involvement in other organizations 
Number of other 
memberships  
0.11a  1.32  1.88b  1.95b  2.52b  2.59b  1565 
Number of other 
board 
memberships  
0.08a  0.16  0.72b  0.47b  —  —  1716 
Satisfaction with organization 
General 
satisfaction  
0.09a  2.54  3.33b  2.98b  3.00b  2.75  1877 
Self-expression 
score  
0.02a  0.71  0.76b  0.75b  0.77b  0.77b  1589 
Turnover 
intentions  
0.04a  2.73  1.70b  2.29b  —  —  1781 
Satisfaction with 
leadership and 
self-development  
0.09a  0.67  0.81b  0.76b  0.84b  0.81b  1727 
Satisfaction with 
community 
involvement  
0.00  0.72  0.73  0.73  0.70  0.76  1760 
Satisfaction with 
status attainment 
and maintenance  
0.02a  0.72  0.78b  0.77d  0.83d  0.84d  1418 
Satisfaction with 
organizational 
efficiency and 
flexibility 
0.00  0.67  0.68  0.67  0.70  0.61  1810 
Satisfaction with 
sociability and 
affiliation  
0.03a  0.78  0.86b  0.84b  0.91b  0.88b  1832 
Note. Data in cells for organizational levels reported as means. a η2 < 0:01. bSignificantly 
different from local members p < 0:01. cη2 < 0:05. dSignificantly different from local members p 
< 0:05. 
Table II. Differences in Mean Responses of Local Leaders, Aspirants, and Nonaspirants to 
Leadership 
Variable Local 
board 
members 
(N=270) 
Never 
member 
aspirants 
(N=500) 
Never 
member 
nonaspirants 
(N=282) 
η2 Past 
member 
aspirants 
(N=123) 
Past 
member 
nonaspirants 
(N=44) 
η2 
Desired rewards of participation 
Leadership 
and self-
development  
10.72  9.54  6.67  0.10a  10.48  10.47  0.00 
Community 
involvement  
15.52  15.38  14.10  0.02a  16.05  14.23  0.03b 
Status 
attainment and 
maintenance  
2.93  2.89  2.53  0.01b  2.79  2.55  0.00 
Organizational 
efficiency and 
flexibility 
10.73  10.36  9.99  0.00  10.85  10.64  0.00 
Sociability 
and affiliation  
5.87  5.76  5.41  0.01b  5.45  5.43  0.00 
Interest in 
internal 
activities  
4.15  3.45  1.54  0.30a  3.99  1.71  0.28a 
Interest in 
external 
activities  
7.76  7.90  5.95  0.12a  8.16  5.61  0.14a 
Status concern  3.96  4.51  4.39  0.00  4.54  3.93  0.01 
Competing role demands 
Employed  0.59  0.67  0.66  0.00  0.73  0.70  0.00 
Number of 
children  
1.68  1.22  1.63  0.03a  1.82  1.81  0.00 
Child under 
age 6  
0.46  0.48  0.45  0.00  0.37  0.36  0.00 
Perceived role 
conflict  
5.86  5.03  6.46  0.07a  5.65  6.79  0.04b 
Knowledge of organization 
Knowledge of 
local chapters  
10.23  6.65  6.06  0.02a  9.79  10.04  0.00 
Knowledge of 
regional level  
1.76  0.98  0.88  0.00  1.62  1.68  0.00 
Knowledge of 
headquarters 
level  
2.40  1.35  1.46  0.00  2.05  2.39  0.01 
Knowledge of 
headquarters 
activities  
7.92  5.98  5.83  0.00  7.72  8.00  0.00 
Exercise of power 
Participation 
in decisions  
12.46  7.14  6.83  0.00  11.10  8.80  0.05a 
Desired distribution of power 
Difference 
between 
desired 
member and 
chapter board 
control 
0.40  0.35  0.36  0.00  0.29  0.27  0.00 
Difference 
between 
desired 
member  
-1.36  -0.73  -0.56  0.01b  -1.31  -1.18  0.00 
Nature of organizational involvement 
Hours per 
week devoted 
to IAW  
9.62  3.99  3.08  0.01  4.68  4.55  0.00 
Time spent on 
internal 
activities  
4.17  1.74  1.09  0.05a  3.16  2.64  0.02 
Time spent on 
external 
4.99  3.77  3.57  0.00  5.08  4.76  0.00 
activities  
Involvement in other organizations 
Number of 
other 
memberships  
1.88  1.33  1.45  0.00  1.93  2.11  0.01 
Number of 
other board 
memberships  
0.72  0.21  0.15  0.00  0.55  0.30  0.02 
Satisfaction with organization 
General 
satisfaction  
3.33  2.70  2.40  0.02a  3.09  2.77  0.02 
Self-
expression 
score  
0.76  0.71  0.71  0.00  0.75  0.74  0.00 
Turnover 
intentions  
1.70  2.13  3.43  0.11a  1.94  2.82  0.04a 
Satisfaction 
with 
leadership and 
self 
development 
0.81  0.68  0.68  0.00  0.75  0.79  0.01 
Satisfaction 
with 
community 
involvement 
0.73  0.72  0.71  0.00  0.74  0.68  0.02 
Satisfaction 
with status 
attainment and 
maintenance 
0.78  0.74  0.71  0.00  0.79  0.72  0.02 
Satisfaction 
with 
organizational 
efficiency and 
flexibility 
0.68  0.67  0.67  0.00  0.69  0.64  0.01 
Satisfaction 
with 
sociability and 
affiliation 
 0.86  0.80  0.75  0.01a  0.85  0.82  0.00 
a = η2 < 0.01. b = η2 < 0.05. 
A number of items focused on members’ “desired rewards of participation.” Five measures of 
desired rewards were constructed based on factor analysis of a set of items that asked 
respondents to rate the importance of possible reasons for membership (Bonjean et al., 1994). 
They tap the importance respondents attributed to leadership and self-development (α = 0.76), 
community involvement (α = 0.74), status attainment and maintenance (α = 0.58), organizational 
efficiency and flexibility (α = 0.69), and sociability and affiliation (α = 0.59). The 
member/chapter board questionnaire also asked respondents about their interest in seven chapter 
activities. Factor analysis suggested that items could be collapsed into two measures: interest in 
internal activities (α = 0.52) and interest in external activities (α = 0.65). We also included a 
measure based on three items from Kaufman’s concern with status scale (α = 0.68) (Kaufman, 
1957).  
Our questionnaires included four indicators of “competing role demands.” Employment status is 
a dichotomous variable, coded positively for members with paid work. Number of children was 
coded from an open-ended question. We used information from a question about the age of the 
respondent’s youngest child to construct a dummy variable for having children under age six. 
Perceived role conflict (α = 0.69) is based on items about conflict between IAW activities and 
other obligations. 
We also included items about “knowledge of the organization.” Factor analysis suggested 
construction of four measures: (1) knowledge of local chapters (α D 0:85), (2) knowledge of the 
regional level (α = 0.87), (3) knowledge of the headquarters level (α = 0.87), and (4) knowledge 
of headquarters level activities (α = 0.87). Local members’ and chapter board members’ 
“exercise of power” within local chapters was measured using a modified version of Hage and 
Aiken’s participation in decisions scale (α = 0.79) (Hage and Aiken, 1967). A set of “control 
graph” items (Tannenbaum, 1968) about “desired distribution of power” over local chapter 
affairs was used to compute two measures, difference between desired local member and chapter 
board control and difference between desired member and regional/headquarters board control. 
We also used the questionnaire to assess “nature of organizational involvement.” All 
questionnaires included an open-ended question about number of hours devoted to IAW activities 
in an average week. The local chapter questionnaire also asked how much time respondents 
devoted to various IAW activities. We used this set of items to construct two measures: time 
spent on internal activities (α = 0.59) and time spent on external activities (α = 0.64). 
“Involvement in other organizations” was tapped by two measures. Number of other 
organizational memberships is the number of organizations listed in response to a question about 
the three organizations besides IAW to which respondents devoted the most time. The local 
chapter questionnaire for 1992 also included an item about how many other board memberships 
the respondent held. 
We also developed several measures of “respondent satisfaction.” First, all questionnaires 
included a single-item measure of general satisfaction. Second, using procedures developed by 
Bonjean et al. (1994), we computed an overall self-expression score for each respondent from 
her ratings of the importance of and her satisfaction with various reasons for membership. The 
score summarizes the extent to which the respondent was able to express her predispositions 
through IAW participation. Third, we developed a two-item measure of turnover intentions (α = 
0.75).We also computed separate self-expression scores for each of the five areas developed in 
the analysis of reasons for participation (see above). These measures show how well respondents 
were able to meet their needs in each of these areas through IAW participation. 
Measures Derived from Other Data Sources 
We used Johnson’s (1993) analysis of annual reports from 12 of the 13 chapters, supplemented 
by questionnaires mailed to each chapter, to establish each chapter’s mechanism of leadership 
selection. Information from interviews with presidents and president-elects was used to 
determine their number of years top leaders had held leadership positions, an indicator of 
leadership turnover. We also used information from annual reports to measure the elaboration of 
internal administration. For the eight chapters that listed member work assignments in their 1992 
reports, we computed the proportion of members engaged in external activities (e.g., community 
projects, public information campaigns, or efforts to influence public policy) versus internal 
assignments (e.g., member training, chapter administration, or internal communications). 
RESULTS 
We present our results in four sections. The first assesses how well the three models of 
leadership fit IAW’s overall leadership structure. The second looks at whether differences 
between the attitudes and behaviors of members and leaders correspond to those predicted by 
each of the models. The third examines differences between aspirants and nonaspirants to 
leadership. Taken together, these results show that no existing model fits the data well. The final 
section explores the elaboration of administrative activity at IAW. It is a key feature of an 
alternative leadership pattern, leadership for self-development, which better explains our results. 
Characteristics of Leadership Structure 
Number of Aspirants to Leadership 
Contrary to the leadership by default and oligarchic models, but in line with democracy, 
aspirants to leadership are plentiful at IAW; 38% of members who had never been on the chapter 
board aspired to serve, and 60% of former board members hoped to serve again. 
Leadership Selection 
Although they vary somewhat by chapter, leadership selection procedures corresponded best to 
the oligarchic model. In all chapters, candidates for top offices are selected by a nominating 
committee. In most chapters, this committee does solicit advice about possible candidates from 
members through a “straw ballot,” but candidates for top offices were invariably single slated; 
that is, members must vote for the candidate proposed by the committee or write in someone 
else. In five chapters, all board members except officers were appointed by the president, 
executive committee, or a selection committee of incoming and outgoing officers. In the 
remaining chapters, members voted on at least some board slots, but only one chapter double-
slated any board candidates. Choices among competing candidates were more common in filling 
nominating committee slots, but even these positions were single-slated in three chapters. 
Leadership Turnover 
Mean length of board service among current chapter board members (2.1 years) was far shorter 
than the oligarchic model would suggest; only 8% had served over 4 years. The policy of 
mandatory “retirement,” at age 40–45 mitigates against long board terms. Questions about “job 
history” in interviews with chapter presidents and president-elects showed that, before their 
present terms, they had been major committee chairs, board members, or officers for an average 
of 3.8 and 3.0 years respectively. With rare exceptions, presidents and president-elects serve 
single 1-year terms. Chapter bylaws allow reelection, but established custom decrees 1-year 
terms, a practice congruent with democracy. 
Differences Between Leaders and Other Members 
Table I reports differences between the attitudes and behaviors of nonleaders and leaders for key 
variables in the models. Shown are the mean values for each of the variables among ordinary 
members, past chapter leaders, and current leaders at the chapter, regional, and headquarters 
levels. For each attitude or behavior, we report the eta-square statistic, the amount of variance 
explained by knowing which of these roles in the organization respondents occupy, and the t 
tests contrasting past chapter leaders, current chapter leaders, regional leaders, and headquarters 
leaders with rank and file members. We do not control for other variables because all of the 
models predict differences between leaders and members at the zero-order level, not differences 
that exist only when other differences between members and leaders are controlled. 
Desired Rewards of Participation 
Leadership in IAW offers no financial compensation, a major attraction for leaders in the 
oligarchical model. Leading a relatively high status organization can, however, provide prestige, 
which the oligarchic model suggests leaders would value more than other members. This 
prediction is not supported. Chapter board members report no more interest in status attainment 
and maintenance than nonleaders, and regional and headquarters leaders are less interested than 
the rank and file. Leaders also reported lower status concern than members. Leaders generally 
place slightly higher priority on community involvement, and local leaders report a bit more 
interest in externally oriented chapter activities, but the differences are small. 
The most striking difference is instead one anticipated by none of the models: leaders’ greater 
desire for opportunities to develop and exercise leadership. Local board members place far more 
emphasis than nonleaders do on these rewards, and regional and headquarters leaders value them 
even more. Leaders’ strong desire to engage in administrative activity is also suggested by the 
large difference between nonleaders’ and chapter board members’ interest in internal chapter 
administration. This interest is evidently focused on occupying and playing administrative roles, 
not—as the democratic model might suggest—on efficient administration, for leaders do not 
value organizational efficiency and flexibility more than ordinary members. 
Competing Role Demands 
Role conflict is a key variable for the leadership by default model, which suggests that the 
unattractiveness of leadership roles leads to the drafting of those who can be persuaded to 
serve—often because they face fewer role conflicts. The data fail to consistently support this 
idea. Chapter board members are slightly less likely than members to hold paid jobs; however, 
regional and headquarters leaders are just as likely as members to be employed. Leaders at all 
levels have more children than nonleaders, although regional and Headquarters board members 
are much less likely to have young children. All levels of leaders perceive no more conflict 
between IAW and other obligations than ordinary members. 
Knowledge of the Organization 
Contrary to the democratic model’s ideal of a highly involved, well-informed membership, rank 
and file IAW members report much less knowledge about the organization than do leaders. Local 
board members are better informed about local chapters than are regional and Headquarters 
board members, while the pattern is reversed for knowledge of the regional and headquarters 
levels. This outcome is consistent with either oligarchy or leadership by default. 
Exercise of Power and Desired Distribution of Power 
That chapter board members participate far more in decisions than nonleaders do contradicts 
democratic norms of high member involvement, but the fact that not only members but also 
leaders view this as undesirable is inconsistent with oligarchy. All levels of leadership, except 
regional board members, agree with nonleaders that chapter board members should have only 
slightly more control over local chapter affairs than members. All levels also agree that regional 
and Headquarters board members should have less influence than chapter members over local 
chapters. This pattern of results is consistent only with leadership by default, in which power 
devolves to reluctant leaders. 
Nature of Organizational Involvement and Involvement in Other Organizations 
Leaders at all levels spend far more time than ordinary members do on IAW work, evidently 
mainly because they spend much more time on administration. This result is inconsistent with 
democratic ideals of high member involvement, but could be explained by the oligarchic model’s 
image of leaders working to make themselves indispensable or by member’s avoidance of 
administrative activity in leadership by default. Leaders also hold more memberships and board 
memberships in other organizations than do nonleaders, and the number increases with 
hierarchical level, a finding also consistent with oligarchy. 
Satisfaction with Organization 
Contrary to both the democratic model’s predictions of high satisfaction among both leaders and 
members, and to leadership by default’s image of leaders as overworked draftees, the results for 
both the single-item satisfaction measure and the more comprehensive self-expression measure 
show that leaders at all levels are more satisfied than nonleaders. They are also less likely to 
consider dropping their membership. Leaders’ higher satisfaction appears consistent with 
oligarchy, but in oligarchy their greater satisfaction should stem primarily from greater 
satisfaction with material rewards. This is not the case. IAW leaders are unpaid, and leaders are 
only slightly more satisfied with the status rewards of membership. Instead, their higher overall 
satisfaction apparently stems primarily from satisfaction of their most important needs: the 
opportunity to function as leaders and develop leadership skills. Interestingly, this is not 
accompanied by satisfaction with organizational efficiency or flexibility. All levels of leaders 
report less satisfaction with this outcome than with any other. Leaders have more IAW friends 
and outside contacts than do nonleaders, so it is not surprising that they are also more satisfied 
with the social rewards of membership. 
Ordinary members’ and chapter board members’ answers to 1992 open-ended questionnaire 
items about what they liked most and least about their IAW experiences generally echo these 
patterns, but provide additional insights. By far, the largest difference between leaders and 
members is once again the former’s emphasis on enjoying the process of leadership; 37 and 32% 
of current and past board members respectively cited opportunities to lead and training in 
leadership, compared to just 10% of other members (p < 0.01). Thirty percent of board members 
and 27% of past members, versus only 14% of other members, mentioned self-development 
opportunities (p < 0:01). As one leader wrote, “I have loved the vast wealth of opportunities 
gained through my experiences … [the] skills and training obtained as president provided me 
with the chance to utilize everything I had learned in the previous ten years.” Respondents were 
much less positive about chapter efficiency and effectiveness. Twenty-five percent of those who 
identified experiences they liked least mentioned inefficiency, making it the single most 
frequently-cited problem. They said that there was too much bureaucracy and paperwork, too 
many and too rigid rules, and too much administrative activity. As one commented, “[IAW] is 
choking on its own bureaucracy.” Others complained that the organization was so self-absorbed 
that it accomplished little. As one member put it, “too much time [is] devoted to what color of 
tablecloths to have at the General Meeting instead of what to do about abused children.” Twelve 
percent of respondents also mentioned meetings that were numerous, long, unproductive, or 
unnecessary. One member’s anecdote captures the flavor of these complaints: “When [one] 
committee conducted fast efficient meetings, we were held suspect by that year’s executive 
committee of not doing our work because our meetings were not long enough. Good grief.” 
Differences Between Aspirants and Nonaspirants to Leadership 
Table II, derived from the local chapter questionnaire, compares behaviors and attitudes of 
aspirants and nonaspirants to local board membership. To provide a clear contrast, we omit those 
who were “uncertain” about wishing to serve. Results are shown separately for those who have 
never been on the board and those who have previously served. Chapter board members’ 
responses are repeated from Table I for comparison. In interpreting the results, we focus on the 
democratic and oligarchic models. Leadership by default, which envisions vanishingly small 
numbers of aspirants, offers no predictions about their characteristics except that they would 
experience less role conflict. 
Desired Rewards of Participation 
The oligarchic model differs from the democratic mainly in predicting that leadership aspirants 
are more oriented to material rewards than are nonaspirants. Aspirants who have never been 
leaders do place slightly more emphasis on status attainment and maintenance and between 
status concern than nonaspirants, but only one of the four differences is significant. Moreover, 
the direction of the differences is reversed in some 1975 comparisons. Aspirants also place 
somewhat more emphasis on community involvement rewards, and they report considerably 
more interest in participating in the external community activities of their chapter. They are not, 
however, more interested in making the organization more efficient or flexible. 
As in the comparison between leaders and members, the largest difference between aspirants and 
nonaspirants to leadership involves leadership and self-development. Among those who have 
never been on the chapter board, aspirants rate such opportunities as much more important than 
do nonaspirants. Past board members who wish to serve again do not differ much in this respect 
from past member nonaspirants; however, among both those who have never served on the board 
and those who have, leadership aspirants report much greater interest in participating in internal 
chapter activities, most of which involve administration. 
Competing Role Demands 
Results for the objective indicators of role conflict show clearly that employment is not an 
impediment to desiring leadership, while that the effects of family obligations are weak and 
inconsistent. Nevertheless, in all comparisons, nonaspirants clearly perceive more role conflict. 
The perceptual data are thus in line with leadership by default, but the objective data are not. 
Knowledge of the Organization 
In 1992, aspirants’ knowledge of IAW was not consistently greater than the knowledge of 
nonaspirants, but in 1975 aspirants were more knowledgeable in all comparisons. The 1975 
results would be compatible with oligarchical leadership, in which aspiring leaders seek 
information to prepare themselves to occupy and hold leadership positions, but the 1992 findings 
are not. 
Exercise and Desired Distribution of Power 
Leadership aspirants who have never been board members report no larger role in decisions than 
their counterparts who do not wish to serve. This appears consistent with democracy, but their 
involvement is far lower than that of current board members, which fits better with oligarchy. 
Former members who wish to serve again participate more than those who do not, suggesting 
that they may continue to function informally as leaders. Both aspirants and nonaspirants prefer 
decentralized power, with little difference between them. This last finding is consistent with 
democracy. 
Nature of Organizational Involvement and Involvement in Other Organizations 
The oligarchic model suggests that—in order to acquire the expertise needed to claim and hold 
leadership roles—aspirants to leadership would devote much more time to the organization than 
other members. Aspirants do generally spend more time on IAW than nonaspirants, but the 
differences are small; aspirants, however, do not approach the time commitment of current board 
members. As the oligarchic model would predict, aspirants who have never been leaders also 
spend more time than their peers on internal chapter administration. Past leaders who would like 
to be board members also report continued high involvement in internal administration, 
suggesting again that some remain informal leaders. Leadership aspirants report neither more 
memberships nor more service on the boards of other associations than nonaspirants. This is 
inconsistent with oligarchy, which holds that such time investments are needed to develop the 
contacts that make leaders indispensable. 
Satisfaction with Organization 
Under oligarchic leadership aspirants to leadership are somewhat less satisfied than other 
members because they have not yet attained the leadership positions that can fulfill their needs 
for material rewards. Democracy, by contrast, predicts high satisfaction among both groups. 
Responses to the single-item indicator of overall satisfaction and the measure of turnover 
intentions among those who have never been leaders show somewhat higher satisfaction among 
aspirants. Aspiring to lead is unrelated to self-expression, and there is no significant difference 
between past leader aspirants’ and nonaspirants’ responses to the general satisfaction question. 
Comparisons of aspirants’ and nonaspirants’ self-expression scores for the five specific rewards 
reveals few differences, and aspirants are not less satisfied with status attainment and 
maintenance rewards. There were also few differences between aspirants’ and nonaspirants’ 
responses to open-ended questions about best- and least-liked IAW experiences. 
The Elaboration of Internal Administration 
Leaders’ and aspiring leaders’ strong motivation to participate in leadership for the sake of self-
development and the large amount of time leaders devoted to internal administration imply that 
leaders’ enjoyment of the leadership process might lead to the evolution of an elaborate 
administrative apparatus to fulfill these needs, which might then attract leadership aspirants with 
strong needs to administer. The resulting elaboration of administrative activity, in conjunction 
with leaders’ lack of special interest in efficiency and flexibility, might also help to account for 
the many complaints about organizational inefficiency noted above. 
There is ample evidence of elaboration of administrative activity in IAW chapters. In the eight 
chapters for which 1992 annual reports provide full information, an average of only 56% (range 
33–80%) of members had any external work assignment. This means that, on average, at least 
44% of members devote all of their energy to internal chapter activities. Moreover, some of 
those with an external work assignment also had an internal assignment. 
Elaboration of administration is also apparent in descriptions of organizational structure in 
annual reports and in accounts of how decisions are made from officer interviews. Both reveal a 
pattern in which committees and meetings multiply, decisions pass through numerous 
committees, simple tasks require months to complete, elaborate arrangements are made for 
meetings, and much effort goes into publishing professional quality newsletters, slick monthly 
magazines, annual reports, and member directories. 
Consider for example, the administrative structure of one chapter of about 150 members chosen 
at random. It has a nine-member Executive Committee, including five vice presidents, each of 
whom oversees several committees. The Board of Directors includes 30 additional women. 
Fifteen are chairs or co-chairs of the following committees: Member Training (11 members), 
Meeting Arrangements (13), Planning (10), Probationary Member Training (9), Publicity (6), 
Internal Affairs (10), New Member Recruitment (7), Nominations and Work Assignments (15), 
Community Needs Research (12), Headquarters (3), Ways and Means (9), Business Partnerships 
(7), and Newsletter (2). The Board also includes the president’s assistant, secretary, annual report 
editor, chairs of two fundraising efforts, the chair of the Local Policy Impact Committee, two 
representatives to the State Policy Impact Committee, a director of Community Projects, a 
Community Boards Liaison, and three chairs of Community Conferences. 
Officers’ descriptions of decision-making processes provide additional evidence of 
administrative elaboration. The president of a chapter with only about 100 members explained 
how members’ annual work assignments are made as follows: 
Before the process begins, we produce a detailed brochure that lists and explains all the 
work assignments, both within the chapter and in the community. Each of the nine 
members of the work assignment committee is assigned as the Work Assignment Advisor 
for 10 to 15 members. Each member has an individual interview with her Advisor, where 
she ranks her top three choices of work assignments. The President-Elect, the incoming 
members of the Executive Committee, the outgoing and incoming chairs of the Work 
Assignment Committee, and the chair of the Nominating Committee are then constituted 
as a Selection Committee. They choose Board members, non-elected officers, and chairs 
of the fundraising committees. The outgoing and incoming chairs of the Work 
Assignment Committee and the President-Elect then meet to make work assignments for 
the remaining members. 
Elaborate structure and procedures were also cited in many member’s responses to the 
questionnaire item about what they liked least about IAW. One described her chapter this way: 
“Too much bureaucracy. By the time a committee decides to do something and it goes through 
the approval steps, half the year’s gone.” Another summarized the problems of an elaborate 
committee structure as follows: “The committee structure so often creates a bureaucracy that 
seems incapable of getting anything accomplished in a timely fashion.” 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Our results conform to each of the three existing models in some respects, but they are 
incongruent with many key features of each. Contrary to the democratic model, leadership 
selection is not very democratic. Existing leaders are much more knowledgeable about the 
organization, more interested in its administration, and participate more in decisions than the 
rank and file, and they report greater satisfaction. In contrast to the leadership by default model, 
many members desire to lead. Leaders value leadership opportunities greatly; they are not 
unwilling conscripts distinguished mainly by fewer role conflicts. Leaders are more satisfied 
than members and find their experiences very rewarding. Rather than fleeing from leadership 
responsibilities at the first opportunity, former leaders remain involved in decision making. More 
than half desire to serve again. 
IAW leadership also fails to conform to the oligarchical model. Most leaders serve a relatively 
short time, ruling out a permanent leadership clique. The organization’s mandatory “retirement 
age” may act to inhibit formation of such cliques, and the customary 1-year “term limit” for 
presidents mitigates against their development (Styrjan, 1989). The long-term persistence of 
these aspects of organizational structure contradicts Michels’ prediction of evolution toward 
oligarchy. Second, both leaders and leadership aspirants share ordinary members’ desire for 
decentralized power. Third, leadership—even at the regional and headquarters levels—is 
unremunerated and provides few perquisites. Nor do leaders and aspirants report greater interest 
in prestige. Fourth, the large number of aspirants to leadership is inconsistent with Michels’ 
argument that most members would not seek leadership roles. Finally, aspirants to leadership 
who have not yet obtained leadership roles are no less satisfied with their IAW participation than 
other members, suggesting that they expect the abundance of leadership positions and steady 
turnover of leaders to provide them with the opportunity to serve. 
The discrepancies between our findings and the three existing models are thus too great to 
sustain the conclusion that any one of them is an adequate depiction of the structure and 
functioning of leadership at IAW. They suggest, instead, looking at whether there might be an 
alternative (and until now undescribed) model of leadership and at what factors might produce it. 
To be a viable alternative to democracy, oligarchy, and leadership by default, such a model 
would (a) need to be a comprehensive, internally consistent model of leadership, in which key 
variables reinforce one another to form a stable system, and (b) be applicable beyond IAW. In 
the following paragraphs we extrapolate such a model, which we call leadership for self-
development, from the IAW case study and speculate about the conditions that generate it and 
where else it might be most apt to appear. Some impressionistic data do suggest that this model 
may have applicability beyond IAW, but this hypothesis remains to be tested by future research. 
In leadership for self-development, leaders and leadership aspirants differ from other members 
mainly in that they wish to play leadership roles, which they see as an enjoyable activity that 
contributes to personal development, not as a path to material rewards or prestige or as an 
onerous duty. The desire to exercise and develop leadership skills can, of course, motivate some 
leaders in any association, but in leadership for self-development, it is the preeminent motivation 
of most leaders. Leaders are keenly interested in administrative activity, but not for the sake of 
creating an efficient, flexible organization. Their focus instead lies in the exercising and 
development of administrative skills. They enjoy the administrative process—moving the 
organizational furniture from place to place—largely because such processes afford them these 
opportunities. Like oligarchy, leadership for self-development leads to the concentration of 
information, outside contacts, and decision making in the hands of leaders, but these outcomes 
result from their desire to administer, not from a lust for power, money, or prestige. An elaborate 
administrative structure is likely to result, since it provides many members with the leadership 
opportunities that they value and makes them highly satisfied. 
In leadership for self-development, aspirants to leadership have predispositions similar to 
existing leaders, and some members are drawn to the organization because of the leadership 
opportunities it provides. Steady leadership turnover and a large number of leadership roles make 
it likely that most who aspire to lead will succeed. Hence, aspirants to leadership are more 
committed to the organization than are other members, less likely to consider resigning, and 
more apt to define their participation as involving little role conflict—even if they put in many 
more hours and do not face less demanding work or family situations. This is not to say that all 
members necessarily join such organizations in hope of developing their leadership skills, for the 
organizations often have other formal goals and offer members other rewards. Such members 
presumably find the other rewards that the organization provides adequate to sustain their 
involvement and provide a pool of followers. 
Some aspects of leadership for self-development, like democracy, oligarchy and leadership by 
default, can hinder effectiveness. A great deal of time goes into administration, committees and 
meetings multiply, and procedures become increasingly labyrinthine. While this may meet some 
members’ needs for leadership activity, others are apt to complain that time and resources are 
diverted from other goals, and both members and leaders are frustrated by the low flexibility and 
efficiency that result. Typical complaints are that meetings are too long, procedures are too 
complex, and attainment of stated goals is hindered by too much administrative activity. 
There have not been enough careful case studies of voluntary association leadership to determine 
how widespread leadership for self-development might be, but several surveys of voluntary 
association leaders (Rich, 1980; Widmer, 1985) suggest that it exists elsewhere, as do the 
numerous anecdotal accounts of faculty senates, neighborhood associations, and community 
theaters that discussions of our results with others elicited. Nevertheless, its prevalence remains 
to be established. 
Available data are also insufficient to develop a complete account of the conditions that create 
and sustain leadership for self-development. Based on the IAW case study, we suggest the 
following organizational conditions as conducive to its development. First, the pattern is likely to 
appear when an organization has an overriding goal of leadership training. This is clearly not the 
case at IAW, where training community leaders is subordinate to community service; however, 
youth leadership training groups or groups designed to develop specific leadership skills, such as 
Toastmasters in the United States, might fit this description. Second, leadership for self-
development might be especially likely to evolve when goals are vague and success hard to 
measure. IAW, with goals like community service and promoting voluntarism, fits this 
description well, but so do many other organizations, such as Junior Chambers of Commerce, 
college service sororities, or faculty senates – some of which do not include leadership training 
among their formal goals. Lack of clear, measurable goals makes it easy for an organization to 
drift toward leadership for self-development without giving up its stated mission, and makes it 
harder to criticize for inefficiency. Moreover, members attracted by the opportunity to display or 
develop leadership skills may be disinclined to levy such criticisms. Third, leadership for self-
development may more often occur in organizations that offer relatively little access to tangible 
material rewards or real power. Unlike labor unions or political parties, IAW lacks the financial 
resources to pay its leaders or offer extensive perquisites. Nor does it have the clout to attract 
leaders who enjoy playing “power politics” in the community or society. Such organizations 
must use other inducements to attract leaders or risk the difficulties associated with leadership by 
default. Offering opportunities for acquiring and displaying leadership skills thus provides an 
avenue for attracting leaders, especially those who enjoy more genteel administrative activity. 
Finally, leadership for self-development may be likely to appear when organizational structures, 
such as mandatory retirement and short terms for officers, make it hard to develop entrenched 
leadership cliques. 
The IAW case also implies that the probability that such organizational conditions will produce 
leadership for self-development increases when the pool of prospective members contains many 
individuals for whom this type of reward is particularly attractive because of lack of opportunity 
to develop or display leadership skills in other venues. This is a frequently cited explanation of 
higher status women’s high involvement in community organizations in the United States 
(Ostrander, 1984; Daniels, 1988), but it may apply equally well to relatively unsuccessful 
academics who make a career of university committee service or unsuccessful sales 
representatives or managers who compensate by a high level of involvement in clubs and 
associations (Kanter, 1993). Personality characteristics or a propensity to favor a particular 
leadership style may also be relevant. Organizations like IAW or Toastmasters, for example, may 
be most attractive to those uncomfortable with confrontational political or social movement 
organizations (Daniels, 1988, Johnson, 1993). Finally people may seek out association leadership 
because they hope to parlay leadership skills developed in the organization into leadership 
positions in paid employment, other voluntary associations, or community networks. Though we 
cannot determine the direction of causation, our results show that IAW leaders do, in fact, hold 
more memberships and leadership positions in other associations than other IAW members. 
The IAW case suggests that once in place, leadership for self-development tends to perpetuate 
itself. The elaborate administrative structure provides many opportunities to lead, and policies or 
customs that block the development of oligarchy and encourage leadership turnover may evolve. 
The focus on leadership for self-development also becomes institutionalized and legitimated by 
the organization’s culture, contributing to the pattern’s maintenance. To the extent that an 
organization develops a reputation for offering opportunities for aspiring leaders, it can attract a 
steady stream of members who desire leadership opportunities. 
The discussion above provides good reason to think that leadership for self-development exists 
in organizations other than IAW, some of them possibly quite different in formal goals and 
membership composition. Additional case studies of organizations that conform to the conditions 
suggested above would thus be especially valuable. Estimation of the prevalence of various 
patterns of voluntary association leadership will, of course, require either a series of case studies 
or an exceptionally well-funded inquiry able to investigate a large sample of voluntary 
associations. Both case studies and larger sample research need to explore as well the effects of 
national context on the leadership structures of voluntary associations, since the claims to cross-
national applicability that are implicit in all of the models have to date been examined only for 
the democratic and oligarchic models. 
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Notes  
1 The “International Association ofWomen” is, for reason of research ethics, a pseudonym of a 
leading women’s service organization. 
2 Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, North 
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3 Sprint PCS, 4701 Mercantile Drive North, Fort Worth, Texas. 
4 University of Texas at Austin. 
5 Correspondence should be directed to William T. Markham, Department of Sociology, 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 324 Graham Building, Greensboro, North Carolina 
27402; e-mail: wtmarkha@uncg.edu 
6 As results from the 1975 survey were broadly similar, the 1992 result are emphasized in this 
article. Additional details, including information about the 1975 measures, wordings of 
underlying items in both years, and descriptive statistics for all measures are included in a longer 
working paper available on request. 
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